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INTRODUCTION

If a “fog of law” has settled over contemporary armed conflict, how might
we find our way through it?1 It seems there is no rule of the law of armed
conflict whose content or application is not disputed by distinguished scholars or experienced practitioners. These disputes may arise from the ambiguity or vagueness of some rules, the incompleteness of others, or inconsistencies between different rules. It does not help matters that general problems
with the identification and application of customary international law are
magnified with respect to the customary law of armed conflict.
Legal indeterminacy, in its different forms, might be reduced or resolved
in light of the object and purpose of the law of armed conflict, or by taking
into account other relevant rules of international law. Unfortunately, the purpose of the law of armed conflict is itself the subject of deep disagreement.
So is the relationship between the law of armed conflict and other branches
of international law, most notably the law of inter-State force and human
rights law. Most corrosively of all, some are quick to denounce purposive
interpretation of existing law as covertly proposing new law and systemic
integration as conflation or corruption.2 If this atmosphere persists, the fog
of law may never lift.
One aim of this article is simply to map these forms of legal indeterminacy—ambiguity, vagueness, incompleteness, and inconsistency—and the
different legal techniques available to address each of them, using concrete
1. This article grows out of a workshop on “The Fog of Law” held at the U.S. Naval
War College from May 15–16, 2018.
2. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795, 838
(2010) (“NGOs and others are even more unfettered in pushing the balance in the direction
of humanity. After all, their raison d’être is to do so, and they pay no price for forfeiting a
degree of military necessity. The result is . . . a frequent assertion of lex ferenda in the guise
of purported lex [lata].”) [hereinafter Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity]; Michael N.
Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 5, 43 (2010) (“The lex specialis dynamic
explains the Interpretive Guidance’s circuitous attempt to squeeze a plainly human rights
norm into a restraint on attacks against direct participants under the guise of IHL.”) [hereinafter Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance]; Geoffrey S. Corn, Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks &
Eric Talbot Jensen, Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 536, 601 (2013) (“One explanation for the assertion of a least
harmful means rule is that it is an explicit (or perhaps subtle) effort to extend human rights
law’s proportionality protections applicable to peacetime law enforcement activities into the
treatment of belligerents during armed conflict.”).
119

International Law Studies

2019

controversies to illustrate abstract ideas. A second aim is to defend one view
of the purpose of the law of armed conflict, as well as its relationship with
other rules of international law. The purpose of the law is not to balance a
constraining principle of humanity against an authorizing principle of military necessity. Instead, the purpose of the law is simply to protect persons
and objects to the greatest extent practically possible, that is, without depriving other rules of international law, which authorize certain uses of armed
force, of practical effect. These clarifications may improve purposive interpretation of the law of armed conflict and, perhaps, make the field safe for
systemic integration once more. A final aim is to suggest that the law of
armed conflict contains a number of clues for its own interpretation, some
of them hidden in plain sight, including a recurring pattern of general protections with limited exceptions.
II.

VARIETIES OF INDETERMINACY

Legal indeterminacy arises from different sources and takes different forms.
I will discuss four: ambiguity, vagueness, incompleteness, and inconsistency.3
Briefly, a rule may be expressed in ambiguous terms that carry multiple meanings in ordinary language. A rule may be expressed in vague terms that neither
clearly apply nor clearly fail to apply to particular facts. A rule is incomplete if
it lacks essential elements. Two rules are inconsistent if one contradicts the
other. I will discuss these varieties of legal indeterminacy in the context of
treaty interpretation, although much of what I will say applies, with appropriate modifications, to customary international law as well.
A. Ambiguity
Ambiguous terms carry multiple meanings in ordinary language. When such
terms appear in legal texts, the single meaning they carry may be indicated
by their context or illuminated by the object and purpose of the law. Other
relevant rules of international law must be taken into account, and, where it
exists, subsequent agreement by the parties or subsequent practice establish-

3. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM LAW
REVIEW 453, 469 (2013).
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ing the agreement of the parties must be considered. In some cases, the preparatory work leading to the adoption of a legal text may help to confirm or
determine its meaning.4
The law of armed conflict begins with the conditions of its own application. Ambiguity begins there as well. Suppose that one State wishes to strike
a non-State armed group on the territory of another State. The territorial
State refuses to consent. The intervening State asserts that the territorial State
is unwilling or unable to suppress the armed group. The territorial State rejects that characterization. The intervening State asserts a legal right to strike
the group. The territorial State asserts a legal right against armed incursion.
If the intervening State strikes the armed group without the consent of the
territorial State, is the intervening State bound by the law of international
armed conflict, the law of non-international armed conflict, both, or neither?
The law of international armed conflict applies to any armed conflict that
may arise between two or more States. In the previous example, does an
armed conflict arise between the intervening State and the territorial State?
The question is difficult to answer because the term ‘conflict’ is ambiguous,
meaning either ‘dispute or disagreement’ or ‘clash or collision’ in different
contexts. Accordingly, on one view, an armed conflict arises between States
whenever a conflict between States leads to armed violence, that is, whenever
one State seeks to settle its international disputes, not by peaceful means, but
through the use of force. On an opposing view, an armed conflict arises
between States only if their armed forces clash, that is, upon the outbreak of
hostilities between them.5
Which meaning the term ‘conflict’ carries in this context may depend on
the purpose of the law of international armed conflict and its relationship
with other rules of international law. On one view, the law of international
armed conflict primarily aims to protect civilians of one State from dangers
4. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
5. Compare COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF
THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32
(Jean Pictet ed., 1952) (concluding “any difference arising between two states and leading to
the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict”), and Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (holding that an
international armed conflict exists whenever there is “resort to armed force between
States”), with COMMITTEE ON THE USE OF FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2010)
(finding that State armed forces must be “engaged in fighting of some intensity”).
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arising from the military operations of other States. By contrast, the law of
non-international armed conflict primarily aims to protect civilians from the
military operations of their own State as well as those of organized armed
groups who fight where these civilians live. Accordingly, in the previous example, an armed conflict arises between the two States because the intervening State’s military operations may endanger civilians in the territorial State
even if no clash of forces occurs.
On a different view, the law of international armed conflict aims to regulate hostilities between the armed forces of opposing States. By contrast,
the law of non-international armed conflict aims to regulate hostilities between State armed forces and organized armed groups, or between such
groups. Accordingly, in the previous example, the intervening State’s use of
armed force does not give rise to an armed conflict between the two States,
unless and until the armed forces of the territorial State respond in kind.
Let us now take into account other relevant rules of international law.
On one view, the law of inter-State force and the law of armed conflict regulate different things, not different parts of the same thing. They arise from
different legal texts, written by different drafters, adopted at different times,
animated by different concerns. Perhaps to avoid confusion, we should contrast the jus in bello with the jus ad vim, rather than the jus ad bellum, to underscore that the law of inter-State force and the law of international armed
conflict have distinct subject matters that only partially overlap.6 Accordingly, international armed conflict arises not from the use of inter-State force
as such, but from bilateral hostilities, attacks on State institutions, or some
combination of factors.7
On a different view, the modern jus ad bellum regulates the resort to interState force, while the modern jus in bello regulates the conduct of inter-State
force. Like a hand in a glove, these two bodies of law are distinct, yet move
as one. The modern jus belli arose, in part, to close the gap left by the previous
regime between war, which was generally renounced and increasingly constrained, and measures short of war, which seemed to fall into a legal black
6. The jus ad vim governs the use of force short of war. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST
UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS, at xv (4th
ed. 2006). Strictly speaking, since the legal institution of war no longer exists, all uses of
force fall short of war and under the jus ad vim. See Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of
War in Modern International Law, 36 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY
283 (1987).
7. See, e.g., Noam Lubell, Fragmented Wars: Multi-Territorial Military Operations against Armed
Groups, 93 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 215 (2017); Terry D. Gill, Classifying the Conflict in
Syria, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 353 (2016).
AND
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hole. It did not arise to create a new gap between armed conflict constrained
far more than war ever was, and armed force short of armed conflict, which
would remain in a legal black hole. Accordingly, every use of inter-State force
gives rise to an international armed conflict to which the law of international
armed conflict applies.
Predictably, the latter view invites the tiresome charge of conflation.8 By
the terms of the indictment, the independence of the jus ad bellum from the
jus in bello does not mean simply that an act may violate one, the other, both,
or neither. Instead, the independence of these two branches of international
law is supposed to preclude taking one branch into account while interpreting the other. We should reject this inflation of conflation.
Notably, Protocol I begins by recalling that “every State has the duty,”
in conformity with the UN Charter, “to refrain . . . from the threat or use of
force.”9 This alone indicates that the modern law of international armed conflict must be read against the background of the modern law of inter-State
force, not in isolation from it. The preamble continues by supposing it “necessary nevertheless” to reaffirm and develop legal protections for victims of
armed conflicts. Reading these two opening sentences together, it seems
that, if any State uses force against another—either in breach of the UN
Charter or in conformity with it—then an armed conflict will thereby arise
whose victims will require legal protection. While it is possible to maintain
that armed conflicts typically arise from inter-State force, the more natural
reading is that armed conflicts automatically arise from inter-State force. The
preamble’s next sentence expresses the conviction that nothing in the Protocol can be construed as legitimizing or authorizing any act of aggression
or any other use of force inconsistent with the UN Charter. Since acts of
aggression and other unlawful uses of force typically involve first strikes,10
the sentence only makes sense if the Protocol applies to such strikes. Only
on that assumption would it seem necessary to clarify that the Protocol does
not legitimize or authorize the first strikes to which it applies.
The preamble concludes by reaffirming that the law of armed conflict
must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons whom it protects,
without any adverse distinction based on, among other things, which party
8. See, e.g., Lubell, supra note 7, at 237; Gill, supra note 7, at 369.
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts pmbl., June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
10. In this context, a first strike is simply the first use of military force between two
States.
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is violating the law of inter-State force and which party is in conformity with
it. While the equal application of the law of armed conflict is a sound legal
principle, the independence of the law of armed conflict from the law of interState force is not. As we have seen, these two bodies of law are interdependent,
sharing a division of labor, one seeking to constrain and limit what the other
seeks but often fails to prevent. While the law of armed conflict equally constrains aggressors and defenders, we must never forget that it is aggression
and defense—not the fact of hostilities and certainly not the legal institution
of war—that we are constraining.
Similar problems arise with respect to the law of non-international armed
conflict. In the previous example, does an armed conflict arise with the first
use of military force by the intervening State against the armed group, or by
the armed group against the intervening State? Or does an armed conflict
only arise with intense or protracted armed violence between them? Here
too, the answer may depend on the purpose of the law of non-international
armed conflict. If the purpose is to protect civilians from military operations,
then armed conflict arises with the first military operation undertaken by
either party. In contrast, if the purpose is to regulate hostilities, then armed
conflict arises when the battle is joined by both parties.
Notably, if one applies the narrower meaning of ‘armed conflict’ in both
contexts, then a first strike by the intervening State against the armed group
will remain unconstrained by either the law of international armed conflict
or the law of non-international armed conflict. Hostilities between State
armed forces have not yet broken out, and armed violence between State
armed forces and organized armed groups is not yet intense or protracted.
Let us again take other relevant rules of international law into account.
On one view, the law of non-international armed conflict displaces international human rights law, modifies its content, or alters its application such
that the latter offers no greater protection than the former. Presumably, on
this view, the narrower meaning of ‘armed conflict’ should be preferred, so
that the ordinary protections of human rights law operate as long as practically possible. One possible implication of this view is that first strikes by the
intervening State against the armed group may be constrained by human
rights law, unmodified by the law of non-international armed conflict.11
On a different view, these two branches of international law operate in
parallel, each offering their own protections against violence and abuse.
11. See Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus Ad Bellum, 67 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 687 (2016);
Anthony Dworkin, Individual, Not Collective: Justifying the Resort to Force against Members of NonState Armed Groups, 93 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 476 (2017).
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Measures that comply with the law of armed conflict will nevertheless violate
human rights law if they are not strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation.12 Most importantly, deprivations of life may be arbitrary under human rights law even if they fully comply with the law of armed conflict.13 On
this view, the broader meaning of ‘armed conflict’ poses no threat to human
rights law, and should not be disfavored on that basis.14
Here, too, the charge of conflation—this time of the lex generalis and the
lex specialis—is easier to issue than to prove. Notably, Protocol II begins by
recalling that “international instruments relating to human rights offer a
basic protection to the human person.”15 This statement clearly suggests that
the modern law of non-international armed conflict should be read alongside
the modern law of human rights, not in opposition to it. The next sentence
emphasizes the need “to ensure a better protection for the victims of those
armed conflicts”16 not of an international character.17 There is no suggestion
that in such conflicts the basic protection offered by human rights law is
displaced or modified by the better protections of the law of non-international armed conflict. So far as the text of Protocol II is concerned, these
protections may apply in parallel. This reading leaves the application of human rights law in armed conflict to human rights law itself.
12. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
15(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. Note that under Article 15(2)
measures derogating from the right to life “in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts
of war” are permitted, but under Article 15(1) only to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.
13. See, e.g., African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, General Comment
No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life (Article 4)
¶ 34 (2015)
Where military necessity does not require parties to an armed conflict to use lethal force in
achieving a legitimate military objective against otherwise lawful targets, but allows the target for example to be captured rather than killed, the respect for the right to life can be best
ensured by pursuing this option.

14. For my own version of this view, see ADIL AHMAD HAQUE, LAW AND MORALITY
(2017).
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts pmbl., June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
16. Id.
17. It is not entirely clear whether “better protection” means “better protection than
the basic protection offered by human rights law” or “better protection than the humanitarian principles enshrined in Common Article 3,” which is referred to in the first sentence
of the preamble. That question need not detain us here.
AT WAR 35–37
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For its part, Protocol I explicitly recognizes “other applicable rules of
international law relating to the protection of fundamental human rights during international armed conflict” and clarifies that its provisions are “additional to” these human rights protections.18 The fact that this statement appears in a section regarding treatment of persons in the power of a party to
the conflict may reflect an assumption that a State’s human rights obligations
extend beyond its borders only to persons and objects in the State’s control.
If that assumption no longer holds, then it would seem that human rights
law applies alongside Protocol I’s rules governing the conduct of hostilities.
B. Vagueness
Ambiguity is one source of legal indeterminacy, vagueness is another. While
an ambiguous term carries multiple meanings, a vague term may carry a single meaning in its context yet admit of borderline cases. Accordingly, even
those who agree on the meaning of a vague term may reasonably disagree
about its application to particular facts.
Some vague terms—such as ‘effective,’ ‘definite,’ ‘concrete,’ and ‘direct’—are descriptive. In borderline cases, it may be unclear whether or not
such terms accurately describe the facts. Other vague terms—such as ‘humanely,’ ‘cruel,’ ‘degrading,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘excessive,’ and ‘reasonable’—are
evaluative. In borderline cases, it may be unclear whether or not such terms
express a sound value judgment.
When confronted with truly vague terms, we necessarily shift from the
interpretation of legal texts to the construction of mediating doctrines to give
determinate effect to a legal rule whose correct application is indeterminate
over some range of cases. Some mediating doctrines sharpen the edges of a
vague legal rule, offering more precise standards that admit of fewer borderline cases. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) seems to
take this approach to the term ‘take a direct part in hostilities,’ proposing,
roughly, that civilians retain their general protection unless and for such time
as they perform specific acts likely to directly cause harm to one party to a
conflict in support of another.19 Other mediating doctrines list multiple factors, not contained in the rule itself, to consider or weigh when applying the

18. AP I, supra note 9, art. 72.
19. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Nils Melzer ed., 2009). Naturally, I have condensed the ICRC’s view.
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rule to a particular set of facts. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
seems to take this approach to a number of vague terms, including ‘take a
direct part in hostilities’ and ‘feasible.’20
If the notion of a mediating doctrine sounds strange, recall that typically
we do not expect soldiers to directly apply legal rules on the battlefield. Instead, we expect them to apply rules of engagement, which we construct
precisely because applicable legal rules seem too complex, ambiguous, vague,
and so on. We think soldiers will better conform to their legal obligations
indirectly, by directly following rules that we construct. Mediating doctrines
work in much the same way, serving soldiers by helping them conform to
their legal obligations.
The faithful construction of mediating doctrines requires great care and
invites close scrutiny, but there is no alternative. Borderline cases are not
simply a theoretical problem. Borderline cases are a practical problem that
combatants confront on the battlefield where the stakes of both action and
inaction are high, and the need to decide is unavoidable. When we contemplate a particular borderline case as an academic exercise, we need not conclude that a person is taking a direct part in hostilities, or that they are not.
We may simply reserve judgment. But when soldiers confront borderline
cases, they must decide to attack, or to refrain from attack. They have no
third option. They must choose, and if the legal rule does not provide clear
guidance, we must construct a mediating doctrine that will serve them better.
While mediating doctrines are not legal rules, strictly speaking, we may
be legally obligated to construct and apply them. After all, States are legally
obligated to respect and to ensure respect for the law of armed conflict in all
circumstances, clear cases and borderline cases alike.21 If States cannot ensure respect for the law by instructing soldiers to apply vague terms to borderline cases, then they are obliged to adopt mediating doctrines that will
help soldiers avoid violating their legal obligations. So long as a mediating
doctrine is consistent with the relevant text—neither prohibiting what the
Notably, preparation, deployment, and withdrawal are considered integral parts of such specific acts, and that specific act may directly cause harm as an integral part of a coordinated
military operation.
20. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL §§ 5.2.3.2, 5.8.3 (rev. ed., 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
21. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 495 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL]. See also AP I,
supra note 9, art. 80(2) (stating “the Parties to the conflict shall give orders and instructions
to ensure observance of the Conventions and this Protocol, and shall supervise their execution”).
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rule clearly allows nor allowing what the rule clearly prohibits—and faithful
to its purpose—reducing, rather than increasing the risk of error, arbitrariness, and abuse—then its construction serves the law’s most basic aim: to
guide conduct.
The simplest mediating doctrine one might construct is a default or closure
rule that directs decision in borderline cases arising under a primary rule.
With respect to the proportionality rule, the ICRC takes the view that “the
disproportion between losses and damages caused and the military advantages anticipated raises a delicate problem; in some situations there will
be no room for doubt, while in other situations there may be reason for
hesitation. In such situations [of doubt] the interests of the civilian population should prevail.”22 Notice that this passage does not seek to clarify the
meaning of ‘excessive,’ but instead accepts the vagueness of that term and
simply directs combatants to refrain from attack when its correct application
is unclear. In simple terms: in case of doubt whether the civilian harm expected would
be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated, refrain from attack.
Since the proportionality rule prohibits actions on one side of the borderline of ‘excessive,’ and no opposing rule of international law requires actions on the other side of the borderline, this default rule serves combatants
by helping them avoid violating their legal obligations. The default rule
simply requires them to err on the legally safe side. It also seems plausible
that combatants are more likely to overvalue than undervalue anticipated
military advantage, and more likely to undervalue than overvalue expected
harm to civilians (particularly foreign civilians). If so, then this default rule
will more often avoid violations of the proportionality rule than preclude
military action consistent with the proportionality rule. In these ways, the
default rule helps parties to respect and ensure respect for the proportionality
rule in all circumstances.
Needless to say, this default rule is not costless. In borderline cases, this
default rule requires attacking forces to forsake military advantages that the
proportionality rule does not clearly foreclose. The costs of the default rule
therefore depend on the size of the grey area between clear excessiveness
and clear non-excessiveness. If the grey area is fairly small, then the default
rule will not impede military action much more than the proportionality rule
22. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1979 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]. See also Adil Ahmad
Haque, Proportionality and Doubt, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/62375/proportionality-doubt/.
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itself. The proportionality rule, in turn, presupposes that most military advantages are not truly “indispensable for securing the ends of the war,” and
may be forsaken, at least temporarily, without crippling the overall war effort.23 If the proportionality rule’s grey area is fairly small, then the default
rule should not cripple the overall war effort either. In tactical terms, if a
commander determines that the proportionality rule would clearly require
forsaking an advantage were the expected civilian harm only somewhat
greater, then that commander should be prepared to forsake the same advantage in the borderline case that he or she actually confronts.
Now suppose that the proportionality rule’s grey area is quite large, such
that for any anticipated military advantage, very different amounts of expected civilian harm are neither clearly excessive nor clearly non-excessive.
On that assumption, the default rule we are considering would foreclose
many military advantages that the proportionality rule does not clearly exclude. Whether that result would be consistent with the object and purpose
of the law depends on how we understand that object and purpose, as we
shall see.
How large is the proportionality rule’s grey area? Certainly, military practitioners and international lawyers may disagree over how much expected
civilian harm would be excessive in relation to some fixed military advantage.
However, in my view, most disagreements over the application of the proportionality rule do not result from its vagueness but instead from its contestability, a distinct problem so closely correlated with vagueness that it seems
appropriate to contrast them here.24
To correctly apply evaluative terms such as ‘cruel’ or ‘excessive,’ we must
make sound value judgments, typically by applying normative standards to
the facts before us. In some cases, we may endorse the same standard but
arrive at different value judgments because the standard we share is imprecise. In such contexts, the corresponding evaluative term will be vague, admitting of borderline cases. Alternatively, we may arrive at different value
judgments because we endorse different standards. In such contexts, the corresponding evaluative term will be contested.
Suppose that we disagree over whether the civilian harm expected from
an attack would be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
23. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter General Orders No.
100].
24. See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 509, 513 (1994).
129

International Law Studies

2019

We may disagree because we share a somewhat imprecise normative standard and happen to confront a borderline case in which its correct application
is unclear. As between us, the term ‘excessive’ is somewhat vague, neither
clearly applicable nor clearly inapplicable. Alternatively, we may disagree because we endorse different normative standards. Under one standard, the
expected harm may be clearly excessive. Under the other standard, the expected harm may be clearly not excessive. As between us, the term ‘excessive’ is contested.
The normative standard underlying the proportionality rule may be contested on several grounds. First, we may disagree over what gives a military
advantage, such as ground gained or weakening enemy armed forces, its legally cognizable weight.25 In my view, the legal weight of a military advantage
derives from its contribution to “the complete [or partial] submission of the
enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money.”26
As noted above, most military advantages are not truly indispensable for
securing the ends of the war. It is just that obtaining a given military advantage may allow us to secure the ends of the war—that is, the complete or
partial submission of the enemy—with less expenditure of time, life, and
money than we would expend if we pursue the ends of the war without obtaining that military advantage. So the legal weight of a military advantage
typically lies in the marginal expenditure of time, life, and money that we
would avoid by obtaining it.
Second, we may disagree over what forms of military advantage may render civilian harm proportionate, that is, not excessive. In my view, we may
not kill or maim civilians simply to avoid marginal expenditures of time or
money. We may not take lives or inflict injury except to save lives or prevent
injury. So we should judge the excessiveness of the civilian harm we expect
to inflict in relation to the harm to friendly forces or civilians that we expect
to prevent or avoid in current or future military operations as we continue
to pursue the ends of the war.
Finally, we may disagree over whether harm to foreign civilians, friendly
forces, and our own civilians carries the same weight. In my view, there is no

25. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 22, ¶ 2218.
26. See United States v. List et al. (The Hostage Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10,
at 1230, 1253 (1948). If you like, the value of a military advantage corresponds to the military
necessity to obtain it, with the caveat that most military advantages are not strictly necessary
to secure the ends of the war.
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basis in law or morality to inflict greater harm on foreign civilians to avoid
lesser harm to our own forces or our own civilians.27
Accordingly, on my view, an attack may be expected to cause civilian
harm that would be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated
if the expected harm to civilians exceeds the harm to friendly forces or civilians that the attack is anticipated to prevent or avoid, in current or future
military operations. Here, the term ‘excessive’ is not particularly vague.
Of course, on my view, the proportionality rule may remain difficult to
apply, because the consequences of attacks will remain difficult to predict.
How many friendly forces will be killed or injured, in future operations, if
we refrain from striking an enemy commander at home with his family? How
many of our own civilians will be killed or injured, in current operations, if
we refrain from striking an enemy unit launching missiles from the roof of a
residential building? These predictions are hard to make with confidence. At
the same time, we cannot escape predictive uncertainty by adopting a different view of military advantage. For example, it is hardly easier to predict how
much closer an attack will bring us to military victory. The problem of predictive uncertainty must be confronted head-on. But not here.28
In any event, I have stated my view, not to defend it, but simply to illustrate that our deepest disagreements regarding the proportionality rule are
substantive, not semantic, and rooted in its contestability, not its vagueness.
Depending on how we resolve these substantive disagreements, we may find
that neither the term ‘excessive’ nor the proportionality rule as a whole is
particularly vague or imprecise. If we refrain from attack in the borderline
cases that arise, we may find that the marginal cost to effective military action
is not particularly great.
Before moving on, let us take this opportunity to clear up one misunderstanding of the proportionality rule. It is sometimes suggested that the term
‘excessive’ has a different and more permissive meaning than ‘disproportionate’, and that the use of the former rather than the latter gives rise to a different and more permissive rule. On this view, “an attack does not become
unlawful when the expected collateral damage or incidental injury is slightly

27. See, e.g., IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 218 (2009).
28. For an extended discussion of predictive uncertainty, as well as decision procedures
and rules of engagement that may help combatants conform to the law, see HAQUE, supra
note 14, ch. 8.
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greater than the military advantage anticipated (as is suggested by the term
‘disproportionate’), but only when those effects are ‘excessive.’”29
There is nothing to recommend this view. The ordinary meaning of ‘excessive’ is ‘too much,’ not ‘far too much.’30 Expected collateral damage or
incidental injury that is slightly greater than the military advantage anticipated
is slightly excessive in relation to that military advantage and prohibited accordingly. Nothing in the ordinary meaning of ‘excessive’ or its context suggests
any margin of appreciation for attacking forces.
This view seems even stranger in light of the law’s object and purpose.
Among other things, this view cannot pretend to reflect a reasonable balance
between military necessity and humanity. After all, on this view, military considerations prevail whether they outweigh or are outweighed by humanitarian
considerations. Heads, attackers win; tails, civilians lose.
Finally, this view is disconfirmed by the relevant preparatory work. During the drafting of the Additional Protocols, some States opposed the term
‘disproportionate’ because they found it too permissive or, more precisely, too
subjective and susceptible to abuse to effectively protect civilians.31 These
29. Corn, Blank, Jenks & Jensen, supra note 2, at 547; see also ISRAEL MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 185 (2015)
(“As long as there is no significant imbalance between the expected collateral damage and
the anticipated military advantage, no excessiveness exists.”); Geoffrey S. Corn, Self-Defense
Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, 88 INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES 57, 71 (2012) (“[T]he jus in bello proportionality principle . . . obligates the
commander to cancel an attack only when the anticipated harm to civilians and/or civilian
property is so beyond the realm of reason that inflicting that harm, even incidentally, reflects
a total disregard for the innocent victims of hostilities.”); Michael N. Schmitt, Faultlines in
the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
277, 293 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, eds., 2006) (“In fact, the test is one of
‘excessiveness.’ The rule only bans attacks in which there is no proportionality at all between
the ends sought and the expected harm to civilians and civilian objects”).
30. Excessive, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.
org/us/dictionary/english/excessive (last visited Apr. 30, 2019); see also Excessive, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/excessive (last visited Apr. 30, 2019) (defining excessive as “exceeding what is usual, proper, necessary, or
normal”). In this context, excessive clearly means “exceeding what is proper.” The precautions rule limits harm exceeding what is necessary. Since no two attacks are exactly alike,
there is no “usual” or “normal” amount of incidental harm.
31. 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN
ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974–1977), at 54 (Iraq), 56 (German Democratic Republic),
62 (Mauritania), 69 (Indonesia), 69 (Czechoslovakia), 305 (Romania) (1978) [hereinafter 14
OFFICIAL RECORDS]. Compare id. at 37 (ICRC) (“The Red Cross was conscious of the fact
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States typically favored deleting the draft terms “to an extent disproportionate to the direct and substantial military advantage anticipated,” thereby prohibiting all expected incidental harm to civilians.32 No State opposed the term
‘disproportionate’ because it was too restrictive or disfavored attacking
forces.
Other States opposed the use of ‘disproportionate’ because it seemed to
condone any civilian harm that it did not condemn.33 In other words, the
term ‘disproportionate’ implied that both sides to a conflict may cause civilian harm that is proportionate, that is, justified or appropriate “on balance.”
Yet, as one State representative astutely observed, the law of inter-State force
condemns all civilian harm resulting from an act of aggression.34 The law of
armed conflict, applying as it must to aggressors and defenders alike, cannot
endorse what another branch of international law condemns.35 These States
typically favored deleting the rule entirely, apparently on the grounds that
international law should condemn civilian harm, or remain silent, but never
condone civilian harm even impliedly. No State opposed the term ‘disproportionate’ because it condemned too much civilian harm.
According to the rapporteurs,
The so-called rule of proportionality . . . was found ultimately to be acceptable when it was preceded by paragraph 2(a)i and paragraph 2(a)ii
which prescribe additional precautions and phrased in terms of losses “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”, and was supplemented by paragraph 5 to make clear that it may not
be construed as authorization for attacks against civilians.36

that the rule of proportionality contained a subjective element, and was thus liable to
abuse.”), with id. at 60 (Sweden) (“The rule on proportionality . . . should be tightened in
order to avoid abuse.”).
32. See, e.g., id. at 52 (Ghana), 56 (Egypt), 61 (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea),
61 (Uganda), 70 (Albania), 189 (Mauritania).
33. Id. at 69 (Hungary), 93 and 168 (Mongolia), 194 (Czechoslovakia), 305 (Romania);
see also id. at 162 (Vietnam).
34. Id. at 305 (Romania).
35. Id. (“Modern international law prohibited aggression and only wars of defense
against aggression were permitted. The rule of proportionality was therefore against the
principles of international law.”).
36. 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN
ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974–1977), at 285 (1978). The rapporteurs, summarizing
the debate to that point, wrote:
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It seems that States opposed to the term ‘disproportionate’ because they
found it too permissive were satisfied by the additional precautions. States
opposed to including ‘disproportionate’ in the rule because they felt it impliedly condoned proportionate civilian harm were satisfied by the substitution of the term ‘excessive’ and by the supplemental paragraph making clear
that non-excessive harm to civilians is not impliedly authorized or condoned.
Presumably, these States felt that implying that some civilian harm is not
excessive suggests no overall endorsement.
In sum, the term ‘excessive’ was preferred to ‘disproportionate’ because
the former was seen as at least as protective as the latter and, in addition, did
not imply that civilian harm not explicitly prohibited is impliedly authorized.
It would pervert the intention of the parties to now conscript the term ‘excessive’ into efforts to diminish civilian protections.37
Finally, it is sometimes suggested that we should modify the proportionality rule to exclude borderline cases. For example, some scholars argue that
the proportionality rule applies only to cases of clearly excessive civilian
harm.38 Obviously, this is not a plausible interpretation of Protocol I, which
uses the modifier “clearly” eight times but never to modify any of the five
occurrences of “excessive.”39 Nor does the preparatory work indicate that
The principle of proportionality . . . received a mixed reaction. Some delegations
considered it a necessary means of regulating the conduct of warfare and of protecting the civilian population. Other delegations rejected that principle as a criterion and asserted that in humanitarian law there should be no condonation of casualties among civilians. Some who took the latter view considered that it would be
desirable to delete [the rule] as a whole, while others of the latter view proposed
the deletion of the words ‘to an extent disproportionate to the direct and substantial military advantage anticipated.’
Id. at 241.
37. Writing in his personal capacity, one of the rapporteurs later wrote:
This provision codifies the customary rule of proportionality, which [prohibits attacks] that would be likely to involve collateral civilian injury too great to be justified by the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage. While this is a difficult balance to assess, the mere requirement that a commander make the balance
is an important safeguard.
George H. Aldrich, The Laws of War on Land, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 42, 52 (2000).
38. See, e.g., MICHAEL NEWTON & LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 23, 164 (2014).
39. See especially AP I, supra note 9, art. 41(2)(b) (“A person is hors de combat if . . . he [or
she] clearly expresses an intention to surrender . . . .”). Where Protocol I prohibits combatants from attacking only in clear cases, it says so.
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such a restriction was intended. While several States expressed a desire for a
clearer rule to guide junior officers, none favored a more permissive rule
than the one adopted.40 On the contrary, several States expressed concern
that the rule was not sufficiently protective of civilians, that combatants
would exploit its vagueness, resolving every borderline case in their own favor. These States clearly did not understand excessive to mean “clearly excessive.” As for customary international law, these scholars cite no State
practice or legal opinion in support of their claims. Accordingly, it is best to
view these scholars, not as describing existing law, but as proposing a regressive development of the law.
C. Incompleteness
Legal indeterminacy may arise, not from what a legal text says, but instead
from what it leaves unsaid. Legal ambiguity and vagueness arise from semantic or conceptual indeterminacy, from the multiple meanings of words and
the fuzzy boundaries of concepts. Yet a legal rule may be formulated in reasonably clear terms that, nevertheless, leave its legal content unclear. In some
cases, the formulation may fail to identify an essential element of the rule.
For example, a legal duty formulated in the passive voice may fail to identify
who bears the duty.41 In other cases, the parties may have intended that a
special meaning shall be given to a term, but failed to identify that special
meaning.42 When legal texts are incomplete in these ways, the legal rules to
which they give rise take their content, not from what these texts say, but
from what these texts presuppose or leave implicit, which we hope to infer
from their context and purpose.
Civilians enjoy general protection from dangers arising from military operations in both international and non-international armed conflicts. In international armed conflicts, a civilian is defined, roughly, as any person who
is not a combatant, that is, not a member of the armed forces of a party to
the conflict.43 In non-international armed conflicts, no treaty defines who is
40. See 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 31, at 65 (United Kingdom).
41. See, e.g., AP I, supra note 9, art. 70(1) (providing that “relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall
be undertaken” without identifying who must undertake them).
42. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 4, art. 31(4).
43. Infelicitously, participants in a levée en masse are not civilians under Article 50(1) of
Protocol I. Arguably, such persons should have been considered civilians taking direct part
in hostilities.
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a civilian and who is not. This incompleteness leaves the scope of the rules
protecting civilians in non-international armed conflicts unclear. Are members of organized armed groups civilians, enjoying general protection unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities? Or, are they not
civilians, enjoying relatively limited protection unless and for such time as
they are wounded, sick, shipwrecked, detained, and the like?
One possibility is that in a non-international armed conflict, every person
is a civilian. This seems unlikely. The explicit statement that ‘civilians enjoy
general protection’ leaves implicit and unstated that non-civilians, whomever
they are, do not. The very fact that Protocol II refers to both persons and
civilians indicates that not all persons are civilians. On one hand, “[a]ll persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities” enjoy certain fundamental guarantees.44 In contrast, “civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations.”45
The different wording of these provisions suggests that some persons enjoy
fundamental guarantees but not the general protection reserved for civilians.
A second possibility is that, in a non-international armed conflict, every
person is a civilian except members of State armed forces. This seems even
less likely. There is little evidence that members of State armed forces and
members of organized armed groups enjoy different legal protections under
the law of non-international armed conflict. When Common Article 3 extends minimum protections to “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat,” it is generally agreed that these protections apply
equally to members of the armed forces of both State parties and non-State
parties to a conflict.46 Similarly, the only substantive rule of Protocol II that
refers to armed forces and groups applies the same restriction to both.47

44. AP II, supra note 15, art. 4. Similarly, “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities” receive certain minimum protections under Common Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. See, e.g., Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC
IV].
45. AP II, supra note 15, art. 13.
46. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 179 (2016).
47. AP II, supra note 15, art. 4(3) (noting that “children who have not attained the age
of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take
part in hostilities”).
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This process of elimination leaves standing the third possibility that, in a
non-international armed conflict, every person is a civilian except members
of State armed forces and members of organized armed groups. 48 This appears quite plausible in light of the rule’s context and purpose. The rule presupposes armed violence between two or more collectives. This presupposition entails a distinction between persons who join these collectives, persons who fight alongside these collectives without joining them, and persons
who do not fight at all. The rule’s purpose might then explain why persons
who do not fight at all enjoy general protection, while persons who join or
fight alongside these collectives do not. Of course, the purpose of the law is
itself the object of disagreement, a topic to which we will return later.
There is also the important question of who, exactly, is a member of an
organized armed group, as opposed to some broader political or social collective for which the group fights. In other words, who is a member of a
non-State party to an armed conflict and who is a member of its armed forces?
The question was vividly posed by Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland,
Commander, Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve,
when he asked, “is an enemy banker a combatant or not, you know, just
because he doesn’t have an AK leaning up against his, you know, teller window, I mean, he’s still a bad guy, right?”49
In my view, the answer to General MacFarland’s question depends on
whether this enemy banker is, in legally relevant respects, most like a government employee, a private contractor, or a soldier currently assigned to perform financial services. This analogical judgment requires grasping the purpose or rationale of the law, which confers legal relevance on some factual
similarities and differences, but not others.
Why, exactly, do members of armed forces currently performing noncombat functions lack the general protection enjoyed by civilians? Why are
such members liable to attack and incidental harm despite taking no direct
part in hostilities? In my view, the most plausible answer is that such members are trained to fight and subordinated to a military command structure
that may order them to fight at a moment’s notice. In contrast, government
employees, private contractors, and ordinary civilians would first have to be
48. Obviously, the rules protecting civilians exclude the conceptual possibility that in a
non-international armed conflict no person is a civilian.
49. Press Briefing, Lt. Gen. Sean MacFarland, Commander, Combined Joint Task
Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, (Feb. 1, 2016), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/647924/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-genmacfarland-via-teleconference-in-th/.
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conscripted into the armed forces and placed under command authority before being ordered to fight. Accordingly, if enemy bankers receive no combat
training, and are not subject to a military command structure, then they remain civilians.
D. Inconsistency
Legal indeterminacy also may arise from inconsistency between different legal
rules. Each rule may be formulated in clear, unambiguous, and complete
terms. Yet their combined legal effects—the legal duties they impose, the
legal rights they declare—remain uncertain. One rule may require what another forbids, or implicitly deny what another presupposes.
For example, Protocol I defines ‘attacks’ as acts of violence against the
adversary, in offense or defense.50 The term ‘adversary,’ in turn, consistently
refers to the armed forces of the opposing Party, not to its civilian population.51 Accordingly, this provision seems to implicitly deny that acts of violence against civilians are attacks under Protocol I. Of course, Protocol I prohibits making civilians the object of attack, thereby presupposing that acts of
violence against civilians are attacks. It is not obvious how to resolve this
apparent inconsistency.
On one view, the provision defining attacks contains a clear mistake,
such that it cannot be applied as written without defeating the intention of
the parties. While there is a strong presumption that every term in a treaty
must be given legal effect, perhaps this presumption may be rebutted when
necessary to resolve apparent inconsistency. Accordingly, attacks are simply
acts of violence, whether in offense or in defense.52 On an alternative view,
or perhaps a variant of the first, the provision defining attacks is merely incomplete. Attacks are acts of violence against the adversary, in offense or
defense, as well as acts of violence against civilians and civilian objects. On
either view, acts of violence against civilians are attacks, and are prohibited
as such.
Finally, on a distinct view, acts of violence that are (directly) against civilians are attacks if and only if they are also (indirectly) against the adversary.

50. AP I, supra note 9, art. 49(1).
51. See id. arts. 37, 40, 44.
52. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY
ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 27 (2010) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL].
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For example, if one party targets civilians as a means to obtain military, psychological, political, or economic advantage over the adversary, then these
acts of violence are attacks. In contrast, if one party targets civilians out of
sheer malice, then these acts of violence are not attacks, though they may
violate other fundamental guarantees of the law of armed conflict or other
rules of international law.
One inconsistency begets another. Several modern militaries have the
capability to “shift cold,” that is, to redirect missiles mid-flight away from
their original targets toward other locations. Suppose that, after releasing a
missile, it becomes apparent, in light of new information, that the original
targets are civilians rather than combatants or that the attack may be expected to cause excessive harm to many civilians nearby. It is possible to
redirect the missile toward an empty field or parking lot, resulting in far less
damage to civilian objects and no loss of life or injury to civilians. The attackers seem obliged to cancel or suspend the attack on the original target.
At the same time, they may not direct an attack at any civilian object, no
matter its value or the exigencies of the situation. One rule seems to require
what another forbids.53
Under the first and second views described above, it seems hard to deny
that redirecting the missile toward the parking lot unlawfully directs an attack
at a civilian object. Avoiding such an absurd or unreasonable result may be
one reason, though perhaps not a decisive reason, to favor the third view.
On the third view, redirecting the missile would not constitute an attack at
all, since it seeks no advantage over the adversary, but merely to avoid or
minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects.54
III.

PROBLEMS OF CUSTOM

Legal indeterminacy regarding the customary law of armed conflict takes
many forms, some related to those we have discussed, others quite distinct.
State practice may be ambiguous or equivocal. Expressions of legal opinion
may be vague. The resulting rules may be incomplete or inconsistent, due to
their unsystematic and often reactive development. But even more fundamental problems await.
53. Compare AP I, supra note 9, art. 57(2)(b), with id. art. 52(1). Thanks to John Hursh
for underscoring this point.
54. See Adil Ahmad Haque, the “Shift Cold” Military Tactic: Finding Room under International
Law, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/52713/shift-cold-military-tactic-finding-room-under-international-law/.
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Consider that, under Protocols I and II, civilians enjoy general protection
from dangers arising from military operations unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.55 According to the Israeli Supreme Court,
“all of the parts of article 51(3) of The First Protocol express customary
international law.”56 In contrast, according to the United States Department
of Defense, “as drafted, Article 51(3) of AP I does not reflect customary
international law.”57 How should we resolve such disputes?
In particular, the U.S. DoD claims that, under customary international
law, “[t]aking a direct part in hostilities extends beyond merely engaging in
combat and also includes certain acts . . . that effectively and substantially
contribute to an adversary’s ability to conduct or sustain combat operations.”58 This view departs from the ordinary meaning of ‘take a direct part
in hostilities,’ which does not extend beyond engaging in combat.59 Instead,
this view collapses the distinction, clearly drawn in Protocol I, between civilian persons, who lose protection only when they take a direct part in hostilities, and civilian objects, which lose protection when they make an effective
contribution to military action.60
In addition, the U.S. DoD Manual claims that, under customary international law, civilians who have taken a direct part in hostilities in the past
remain liable to targeting and incidental harm until they “permanently cease”
their participation, that is, unless attacking forces make a good faith assessment that these civilians will not fight or contribute to the adversary’s ability
to fight in the future.61 This view departs from the ordinary meaning of ‘for
such time as.’
On the prevailing view, “[t]o determine the existence and content of a
rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there

55. AP I supra note 9, art. 51(3); AP II, supra note 15, art. 13(3).
56. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel,
62(1) PD 459, 492, ¶ 30 (2005) (Isr.).
57. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 20, § 5.8.1.2.
58. Id. § 5.8.3.
59. For an extended critique of these provisions, see Adil Ahmad Haque, Misdirected:
Targeting and Attack Under the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual, in THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL: COMMENTARY AND CRITIQUE
225 (Michael A. Newton ed., 2019).
60. Compare AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(3), with id. art. 52(2).
61. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 20, § 5.8.4.1.
140

Indeterminacy in the Law of Armed Conflict

Vol. 95

is a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).”62 Since the customary law of armed conflict consists of prohibitions, its rules primarily arise
from “negative practice,” that is, from a general practice of States to refrain
from certain conduct out of a sense of legal obligation.63 Accordingly, to
show that Article 51(3) of Protocol I expresses customary international law,
we would need to show that States generally refrain from targeting civilians
who are not currently engaged in combat out of a sense of customary legal
obligation. In contrast, to show that Article 51(3) does not express customary international law, we would need to show either that there is no such
general practice, or that any such general practice reflects treaty obligations
or policy decisions rather than acceptance as customary law. Finally, to
demonstrate that the U.S. DoD’s proposed rule expresses customary international law, we would need to show that States generally conform to the
proposed rule because they accept it as customary law, while perhaps accepting additional treaty obligations and policy constraints as well.
Several problems with the prevailing view arise from the fact that international law requires States to settle their international disputes by peaceful
means and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force. First, if the vast majority of States comply with these requirements,
then there may remain no general State practice with respect to the conduct
of hostilities in international armed conflict, that is, no State practice sufficiently widespread and consistent to create or change customary law binding on
all States.64
Second, the State practice that persists may be unrepresentative. After all,
this practice will exclude those law-abiding States that settle their international disputes by peaceful means. While “[t]he participating States should
62. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/73/10, at 119 (Draft Conclusion 2) (2018) [hereinafter ILC Seventieth Session Report].
63. Id. at 128 (finding that “where prohibitive rules are concerned, it may sometimes be
difficult to find much affirmative State practice (as opposed to inaction); cases involving
such rules are more likely to turn on evaluating whether the inaction is accepted as law”); see
also id. at 133 (stating “inaction may count as practice . . . , however, . . . only deliberate
abstention from acting may serve such a role”).
64. Id. at 135 (Draft Conclusion 8(1)) (“The relevant practice must be general, meaning
that it must be sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent.”). While
Draft Conclusion 8(1) requires general State practice accepted as law, the commentary seems to
require only some State practice generally accepted as law. See id. at 136 n.715 (“A relatively small
number of States engaging in a certain practice might thus suffice if indeed such practice, as
well as other States’ inaction in response, is generally accepted as law (accompanied by opinio
juris)”).
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include those that had an opportunity or possibility of applying the alleged
rule,”65 the participating States will necessarily exclude those that had no opportunity or possibility of applying the alleged rule because they refrained
from the use of force in the first place.
At the same time, the State practice that persists will prominently feature
the practice of States that unlawfully resort to force against other States.66
After all, international armed conflicts typically arise because one side unlawfully resorts to force against the other. It is only a slight exaggeration to
say that empowering those who violate the law of inter-State force to substantially shape the customary law of international armed conflict violates
the general principle that law does not arise from illegality.
Similarly, on the prevailing view, the customary law of non-international
armed conflict will exclude the views of well-ordered States that address
sources of instability before they boil over. Instead, the formation and evolution of customary rules will be driven by States that allow internal disturbances and tensions to devolve into armed conflict.
A familiar problem arises from Baxter’s “paradox.”67 On one hand, even
if Protocol I’s 174 States parties consistently adhere to its terms, this consistent practice alone would do nothing to bring customary international law
into alignment with Protocol I. It would have to be shown that their practice
reflects a sense of legal obligation under both treaty and custom.68 On the
other hand, if Protocol I States consistently adhere to its terms, then there
will be no general State practice closely tracking the U.S. DoD’s proposed
rule. At a minimum, it would have to be shown that these Protocol I States
accept the U.S. DoD’s proposed rule as customary law but refrain from targeting civilians who contribute to the adversary’s ability to fight due to their
treaty obligations.
Ideally, Protocol I States would simply declare that their practice reflects
a sense of treaty obligation, customary obligation, both, or neither. Regrettably, such clear statements are rare. By failing to reveal the legal basis of
their practice, these States risk disqualifying themselves from the formation
65. Id. at 166.
66. See JANINA DILL, LEGITIMATE TARGETS?: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND US BOMBING 134 (2015).
67. See Richard R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 27, 64 (1970).
68. ILC Seventieth Session Report, supra note 62, at 139
Seeking to comply with a treaty obligation as a treaty obligation . . . is not acceptance as law
for the purpose of identifying customary international law. . . . A State may well recognize
that it is bound by a certain obligation by force of both customary international law and
treaty, but this would need to be proved.

142

Indeterminacy in the Law of Armed Conflict

Vol. 95

and evolution of customary law. At the same time, the practice of non-ratifying States may be insufficiently widespread or representative to create or
change customary law binding on all States. Indeed, the very fact that these
States are unwilling to ratify Protocol I suggests that their legal opinions are
not representative of the international community as a whole.
A final problem arises from the fact that, on the prevailing view, only
State practice motivated by a sense of legal obligation or entitlement contributes to the formation and evolution of customary international law.69
State practice motivated by moral or strategic considerations does not, even
if such practice is accepted as lawful by other states. Of course, the law of
armed conflict depends for its practical effectiveness on State armed forces
and organized armed groups accepting that the conduct it prohibits is morally wrong, as well as strategically useless or counterproductive. Paradoxically, this means that States that internalize the moral values and strategic
rationale of the law of armed conflict will be less able to shape or preserve
its customary rules.
In principle, these problems could be avoided by considering, as State
practice, both how States conduct hostilities and how States react to the conduct of hostilities by other States.70 In practice, States are seldom in a position to react to specific military operations by other States, since typically the
relevant facts will be inaccessible, concealed, or denied.71 States may also
have strong political or economic reasons not to publicly condemn the actions of militarily powerful states such as the United States, the Russian Federation, or Saudi Arabia, among others.
69. Id. at 138 (Draft Conclusion 9(1)) (noting “the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation”), id. at 139 (“Acceptance as law (opinio juris)
is to be distinguished from other, extralegal motives for action, such as comity, political
expediency or convenience . . . .”).
70. By its terms, Draft Conclusion 9(1) indicates that only acceptance as law by participating States creates or changes customary international law. Id. at 146 (Draft Conclusion
9(1)) (“The requirement, as a constituent element of customary international law, that the
general practice be accepted as law (opinio juris) means that the practice in question must be
undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation.”). In contrast, the commentary suggests
that acceptance as law by non-participating States may be necessary as well. Id. at 139
(“[a]cceptance as law (opinio juris) is to be sought with respect to both the States engaging in
the practice and those in a position to react to it”). Neither the draft conclusion nor the
commentary suggests that acceptance as law by non-participating States may suffice to create or change customary law, a view to which we will turn shortly.
71. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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An alternative approach would consider, not only State practice conforming to the rule in question, but also State practice involving training and
preparing to conform to the rule should an armed conflict arise. Such an
approach blunts the objection that “talk is cheap,” since such training indicates that the State is willing to back up its words with action if forced to do
so. Notably, on this view, State military manuals are, as such, evidence of
legal opinion, while their use in training constitute State practice. Crucially,
on this approach, States need not engage in armed conflict to create or
change the customary law of armed conflict.72
A bolder approach would reduce the role of practice in the formation
and evolution of the customary law of armed conflict, elevating the role of
general statements of legal opinion.73 On one version, State practice on the
battlefield that is (descriptively) sparse or sporadic may be considered (normatively) sufficiently widespread, representative, and consistent provided that
its acceptance as law is (descriptively) widespread, representative, and consistent.74 On this view, the customary law of armed conflict arises, not only
from general State practice accepted as law, but also from limited State practice generally accepted as law.
On a different version, refraining from the use of armed force counts as
‘negative practice’ with respect to the conduct of hostilities, that is, as deliberately abstaining from particular wartime conduct. After all, one way to refrain from conducting hostilities in a particular way is to refrain from conducting hostilities altogether. Put differently, if a State accepts a rule prohibiting certain battlefield conduct as law, and refrains from such conduct, its
72. See Michael Wood, The Evolution and Identification of the Customary Law of Armed Conflict,
51 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 727, 731 (2018) (arguing that “practice
[States] may engage in outside the battlefield, such as training simulations and weapon acquisition, may also be of relevance”). Though welcome on its own terms, this statement by
the ILC’s Special Rapporteur seems hard to reconcile with the ILC’s draft conclusions.
73. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL Law 146, 149 (1987) (“The more destabilizing or morally distasteful the
activity—for example, the offensive use of force or the deprivation of fundamental human
rights—the more readily international decision makers will substitute one element [State
practice] for the other [legal opinion], provided that the asserted restrictive rule seems reasonable.”); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 757 (2001);
John Tasioulas, Custom, Jus Cogens, and Human Rights, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 95 (Curtis Bradley ed., 2016).
74. Notably, such acceptance as law would mostly come from States not involved in
the practice. As we have seen, the ILC’s commentary leaves room for such an approach,
inconsistent as this might seem with its draft conclusions. See supra note 70.
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practice and acceptance should not be disqualified on the grounds that it
refrains from such conduct in part by refraining from the use of armed force
in the first place.
Modifying the prevailing view in these ways would allow law-abiding,
well-ordered States to create or change customary law by expressing their
considered legal views without engaging in a practice that is often prohibited
and always disfavored by international law. This approach would also allow
the majority of States to create or change customary law by expressing disagreement with the legal views of outlier States without necessarily condemning specific military operations based on incomplete or contested facts.
A final approach would allow the existence and content of customary
rules to be identified through a combination of inductive and deductive
methods, drawing logical inferences from empirically established rules and
principles to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in State practice and opinion.75
Since States are, in the end, free to establish logically inconsistent rules, this
process may follow a pattern of conjecture and refutation, assertion and rejection, as States respond to the hypotheses of judges and scholars. Arguably,
this is how the formation, evolution, and identification of the customary international law of armed conflict actually operates in practice. Rather than
deduce the nature of customary law and the criteria for its identification by
interpreting various treaty provisions,76 we might instead identify the customary practice of customary law identification.
IV.

PURPOSIVE INDETERMINACY77

As we have seen, legal ambiguity, vagueness, incompleteness, and inconsistency may recede in light of the object and purpose of the law. It might
seem obvious that the purpose of the law of armed conflict is the protection
of civilians and other persons not taking direct part in hostilities. Both Additional Protocols announce themselves as relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts. Their preambles identify their reasons for existence,
namely the necessity to reaffirm and develop legal provisions protecting the
victims of international armed conflicts as well as the need to ensure a better
75. ILC Seventieth Session Report, supra note 62, at 126 (stating that the ILC’s approach
“does not in fact preclude a measure of deduction as an aid, to be employed with caution”).
76. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (providing that the Court shall apply, among other things, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”).
77. I borrow this helpful phrase from Janina Dill. See DILL, supra note 66, at 95.
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protection for the victims of non-international armed conflicts. Protocol I
devotes two sections, containing thirty-three articles, to the general protection of the wounded, the sick, the shipwrecked, and civilians.78 Nineteen articles of Protocol I79 and eight articles of Protocol II80 refer to protection of
persons or objects in their headings, and a similar number of articles refer to
protection of persons or objects in their operative provisions.81 Of course,
various articles confer protections on persons or objects without using the
term ‘protection.’82
To say that the purpose of the law of armed conflict is to protect civilian
persons and objects, among others, is not to suggest that the law pursues its
purpose without limits, heedless of external constraints. The reason is simply
that the law of armed conflict must remain consistent with other relevant
rules of international law that may affirmatively authorize military action.
The law of armed conflict may rule out some means and methods of warfare,
no matter how effective they may be, but may not rule out all effective means
and methods of warfare, leaving States with no lawful way to exercise their
rights to use force in self-defense or with Security Council authorization.
The law of international armed conflict must leave room for effective
military action by those lawfully resorting to armed force under the law of
inter-State force. Otherwise, these two branches of international law would
clash, one effectively prohibiting what the other affirmatively authorizes.83
As we have seen, Protocol I begins by recalling that States have a duty to
refrain from the use of force in conformity with the UN Charter, implicitly
recognizing that some uses of force are in conformity with the UN Charter.84
The preamble also states that nothing in the law of international armed conflict “can be construed as legitimizing or authorizing any act of aggression

78. AP I, supra note 9, Part II, Section I (arts. 8–20), Part IV, Section I (arts. 48–67).
79. Id. arts. 10–13, 15–16, 24, 45, 51–56, 62, 65, 76–77, 79.
80. AP II, supra note 15, arts. 7, 9–11, 13–16.
81. API, supra note 9, arts. 19–23, 25–27, 33, 44, 48–49, 58, 71, 73, 75; AP II, supra note
15, art. 8.
82. Most notably, the precautions rules protect persons and objects from avoidable
harm. See AP I, supra note 9, art. 57.
83. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/61/10, at 408 (2006) [hereinafter ILC Fifty-Eighth Session Report] (“The principle of
harmonization. It is a generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a single
issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of
compatible obligations.”).
84. AP I, supra note 9, pmbl.
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or any other use of force inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”85 Implicit, though admittedly unstated, is that nothing in the law of
international armed conflict should be construed as delegitimizing every act
of self-defense or every other use of force consistent with the Charter.
At the same time, the law of international armed conflict applies equally
to all parties to an armed conflict, imposing the same constraints and affording the same protections, irrespective of the nature or origin of the conflict
or the causes espoused by or attributed to the parties. It may seem that, as a
result, the law of international armed conflict must leave room for effective
warfighting by those unlawfully resorting to armed force. In a sense, this is
true. Fortunately, the law of inter-State force leaves no room for any warfighting by those unlawfully resorting to armed force. In this respect, among
others, these two branches of international law share a division of labor.
For its part, Protocol II explicitly recognizes “the responsibility of the
government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the
State.”86 It is not the purpose of the law of non-international armed conflict
to make it legally impossible for States to discharge that responsibility. At
the same time, the law of non-international armed conflict “shall be applied
without any adverse distinction” by all parties to all persons affected by the
conflict.87 In this sense, it is not the purpose of the law of non-international
armed conflict to make it legally impossible for organized armed groups to
threaten law and order, national unity, or territorial integrity. Since the law
of non-international armed conflict does not affect the legal status of the
parties, the legal prohibition of all military action by organized armed groups
may be left to national law.88
It is often said that the law of armed conflict aims to strike a reasonable
balance between humanitarian and military considerations or, more grandiosely, between the principle of humanity and the principle of military necessity.89 This may seem surprising. Protocol I mentions (imperative) military
necessity only four times, within limited exceptions to general protections.90
85. Id.
86. AP II, supra note 15, art. 3(1).
87. Id. art. 2(1).
88. See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 44, art. 3.
89. See, e.g., Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance, supra note 2, at 6 (“IHL represents a very
delicate balance between two principles: military necessity and humanity.”).
90. AP I, supra note 9, art. 54(5) (stating that “derogation from the prohibitions [to
attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population] may be made by a Party to the conflict within [its national] territory . . . where
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Other provisions invoke the necessity to treat wounded and sick combatants,91 overriding public necessity,92 including medical necessity and investigative necessity, the necessity to provide for the needs of the civilian population,93 and urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian population.94 No
one argues that the latter four “necessities” should be elevated to the status
of principles. For its part, Protocol II does not mention military necessity at
all.
As for the principles of humanity, Protocol I invokes them early, though
not often: “In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”95 This version of the Martens Clause, like those before it, does not
say, but perhaps implies, that the law of international armed conflict—both
conventional and customary—also derives from the principles of humanity
(among other things). For its part, Protocol II provides only that “in cases
not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”96 Presumably, this provision reflects the prevailing view at the time
of its adoption that there was no international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts, either derived from the principles of humanity or anything else, beyond Common Article 3, human rights law, and Protocol II
itself.
It is true that earlier treaties avowed a purpose “to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity” or “to diminish the evils of war, as
far as military requirements permit.”97 Yet even these treaties did not treat
required by imperative military necessity”), art. 62(1) (“Civilian civil defense organizations .
. . shall be entitled to perform their civil defense tasks except in case of imperative military
necessity.”), art. 67(4) (stating that “matériel and buildings of military units permanently assigned to civil defense organizations . . . may not be diverted from their civil defense purpose
. . . except in case of imperative military necessity”), art. 71(3) (“Only in case of imperative
military necessity may the activities of the relief personnel be limited or their movements
temporarily restricted.”).
91. Id. art. 14(3).
92. Id. art. 34(4)(b).
93. Id. art. 64(5).
94. Id. art. 70(3).
95. Id. art. 1(2).
96. AP II, supra note 15, pmbl.
97. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight pmbl., Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 MARTENS
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humanity and military necessity as co-equal principles, values, or normative considerations. The laws of humanity and the evils of war are transparently normative ideas. Laws obligate; evils repel. In contrast, the necessities of war are
facts, not values. To say that war cannot be waged without intentionally killing or maiming enemy combatants and foreseeably killing and maiming civilians is simply to acknowledge a brute reality, not to endorse it. Similarly,
military requirements are instrumental requirements, not moral requirements. If you like, military requirements are hypothetical imperatives: to
achieve this military aim, perform this military action. The laws of humanity
are categorical imperatives: do not perform this military action (in this way,
at this time, and so on) regardless of your aims.
The view that military necessity is a legal principle, reflecting a value recognized by international law, might have made sense when, on the prevailing
view, “[t]he law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war
upon another sovereign state.”98 If international law gives States the right to
go to war, for any reason or for no reason at all, then presumably States must
be free to exercise that right effectively. Since each side has the right to make
war on the other, each side must be free to do what is militarily necessary to
win. On this view, the ‘principle’ of military necessity is a necessary corollary
or implication of the right to make war at will. Military necessity is a derivative principle, not a fundamental one, but a principle nonetheless.
Needless to say, any such derivative principle was extinguished with the
right to war from which it derived. Today, international law generally prohibits the use of force, subject to narrow exceptions. States have no right to
do effectively what they have no right to do at all. Accordingly, we must
understand military necessity in a fundamentally different way, not as an authorizing principle entitling both sides to fight, but as a constraining principle
prohibiting both sides from inflicting excessive harm. States that lawfully resort to force, and fight within these constraints, conform to the law. States
that unlawfully resort to force, and violate these constraints, compound their
illegality. Going forward, we might dispense with the concept of military necessity altogether.
Of course, several important legal rules refer to military advantage, including, as we have seen, the proportionality rule. Relatedly, the feasibility or
reasonableness of a precaution depends on all circumstances ruling at the
NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 474; Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539.
98. General Orders No. 100, supra note 23, art. 67.
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time, including humanitarian and military considerations.99 These rules may
seem to call for a balancing or weighing of values, both recognized by the
law of armed conflict. They do not; indeed, they cannot. As we have seen,
the law of inter-State force prohibits the pursuit of military advantage by
aggressor States. Accordingly, the law of armed conflict—applying, as it
must, to aggressors and defenders alike—cannot endorse the pursuit of military advantage as such. International law cannot place value and disvalue on
the same thing at the same time.100
The challenge, then, is to interpret ‘military advantage,’ ‘military considerations,’ and similar terms in ways that both aggressors and defenders can
apply, but that leave entirely open whether an attack that harms civilians is
endorsed by international law as a system or, alternatively, condemned by
one branch of international law and merely tolerated by another. Such an
interpretation must not prohibit all effective military action by defenders,
even if this means tolerating effective military action by aggressors and leaving the condemnation of the latter to the law of inter-State force. I have
sketched such an interpretation above and fill in some details elsewhere.101
What is important here is simply that we ask the right questions.
Where does all of this leave us? Will we reach different interpretive conclusions if we begin by balancing military necessity and humanity or, as I
have suggested, by protecting civilians without precluding military action authorized by the law of inter-State force? It is hard to say. If nothing else,
resolving this purposive indeterminacy may change how we disagree.
Protective interpretations of legal rules are sometimes described as attempts to “skew,” “tip,” “tilt,” or “shift” the balance between military necessity and humanity.102 Rather than simply say that an interpretation is more
99. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL, supra note 52, at 38.
100. For extended arguments along these lines, see HAQUE, supra note 14, at 30–35 and
Adil Ahmad Haque, Necessity and Proportionality in International Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE JUST WAR 255 (Larry May ed., 2018).
101. See HAQUE, supra note 14, ch. 8.
102. See, e.g., Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance, supra note 2, at 6 (claiming that “on repeated occasions [the ICRC’s] interpretations skew the balance towards humanity”);
Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity, supra note 2, at 829 (concluding “that NGOs and
the UN Human Rights Commission tend to tilt the balance in the direction of humanity
should come as no surprise”), 833 (noting that the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance “accords disproportionate weight to the humanity prong of the balance”); see also Sean Watts, Humanitarian Logic and the Law of Siege: A Study of the Oxford Guidance on Relief Actions, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 45 (2019) (“But more than an exercise in a priori humanitarian
interpretation, the Guidance should be appreciated as an alteration in the balance between
humanity and military necessity.”).
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protective than States intended or would accept, the invocation of balance
and principle implies that one legal value is illegitimately privileged and another wrongfully disrespected, when instead each legal value should be given
equal weight. As we have seen, this image of balance is distorted. Military
necessity is a fact, not a value; a reality, not a principle; and a constraint on
the pursuit of the law’s purpose, not a purpose of the law in itself.
Similarly, protective interpretations of the law of armed conflict are occasionally described as illegitimately curtailing the authority of combatants,
which, presumably, means infringing their rights under international law.103
On this view, legal interpretation quickly becomes a zero-sum game, pitting
the legal protections of civilians against the legal prerogatives of combatants.
We should reject this view. It is enough to say that some protective interpretation is incorrect on textual, purposive, or systemic grounds. We need not
pretend that it is therefore unjust to combatants. Combatants have a difficult
job, and if they say that some protective interpretation is unrealistic, then we
should listen. But we need not dress up the realities of warfighting in the
vestments of legal entitlements or pretend that every limitation of their freedom of action is a limitation of their legal rights. Perhaps, if we remove this
source of heat, we will see more clearly in the remaining light.
V.

GENERAL PROTECTION, LIMITED EXCEPTIONS

So far, we have examined ambiguity, vagueness, incompleteness, and inconsistency in the law of armed conflict in light of general rules of treaty interpretation and custom identification. Importantly, some international agreements contain special rules for their own interpretation. 104 As we have seen,
“nothing in this Protocol [I] can be construed as legitimizing or authorizing
any act of aggression or any other use of force inconsistent with the Charter
103. See, e.g., Corn, Blank, Jenks & Jensen, supra note 2, at 562 (endorsing “the core
LOAC authority inherent in the principle of military necessity”), 569 (concluding that “the
principle of military necessity authorizes the use of deadly combat power as a first resort
against legitimate targets”), 624 (endorsing “the fundamental nature of attack authority derived from the principle of military necessity”).
104. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, for example, provides that “[t]he
definition of a crime [in the Statute] shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by
analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favor of the person being
investigated, prosecuted or convicted.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 22(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. This provision precludes the usual method of
simply selecting the best interpretation of ambiguous terms in light of context, object and
purpose, other relevant rules, and so forth.
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of the United Nations.”105 Similarly, none of Protocol I’s fundamental guarantees “may be construed as limiting or infringing any other more favorable
provision granting greater protection, under any applicable rules of international law.”106 These rules preclude various inferences that might be drawn
regarding Protocol I’s relationship with, or effect on, other rules of international law. In addition, none of Protocol I’s precautions rules “may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or
civilian objects.”107 Such attacks, which occur despite taking all feasible precautions to avoid them, may be excused, but they are not justified. Taken
together, these three rules affirm that the law of armed conflict does not
authorize the conduct that it fails to prohibit, or which may be prohibited by
other rules of international law, most notably the law of inter-State force and
human rights law.
Other rules of the law of armed conflict do not state interpretive rules
but invite the application of traditional interpretive canons. Interpretive canons may assist ordinary textual, purposive, and systemic interpretation or, in
some cases, serve as supplementary means of interpretation when textual,
purposive, and systemic analysis leave the meaning of a provision ambiguous
or obscure.108 Naturally, interpretive canons may never override clear text,
purpose, or systemic coherence. Typically, these canons simply name or describe recurring patterns of textual, purposive, and systemic argument,
providing a convenient shorthand for practitioners. However, at the margins, they may support resolving interpretive doubts one way or another.
Among other things, States may be aware of the relevant canons and draft
treaty language accordingly.
Consider the interpretive canon that general rules should be interpreted
broadly, while exceptions and limitations should be interpreted narrowly. 109
This canon may simply alert us to features of the law of armed conflict that
might otherwise escape our notice, in this case the existence of general protections with specific exceptions and limitations. This textual structure may,
in turn, reflect the law’s object and purpose, namely to protect persons and
105. AP I, supra note 9, pmbl.
106. Id. art. 75(8).
107. Id. art. 57(5).
108. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 220–21 (3d ed.
2013).
109. See, e.g., Alexia Solomou, Exceptions to a Rule Must Be Narrowly Construed, in BETWEEN THE LINES OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION?: CANONS AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF
INTERPRETATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 359 (Joseph Klingler, Yuri Parkhomenko & Constantinos Salonidis eds., 2018).
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objects to the greatest extent practically possible. Finally, this canon may
support resolving residual doubts regarding the scope of an exception or
limitation in favor of the general rule, even when the balance of textual, purposive, and systemic considerations remains subject to good faith dispute.
Under both Protocols I and II, “[t]he civilian population and individual
civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military
operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are
additional to other applicable rules of international law, shall be observed in
all circumstances.”110 As the canon suggests, the text reveals a purpose to
establish broad protection for civilians, subject to limitations and exceptions.
Importantly, the specific rules that follow give effect to the general protection. Accordingly, the broad interpretation appropriate to the general protection is equally appropriate to the specific rules that give it effect. Narrow
interpretation of the specific rules would defeat their purpose, which is to
give effect to the general protection. Importantly, the specific rules jointly
give effect to the general protection. As such, a narrow interpretation of a
specific rule, even if plausible in other respects, should be rejected if it would
create gaps between rules, thereby undermining the general protection that
civilians shall enjoy.
Consider that Protocol I prohibits, as indiscriminate attacks, both attacks
“which are not directed at a specific military objective” and attacks “which
employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective.”111 Narrow interpretation of the term ‘cannot’ would render these rules redundant, creating a gap where some distinct protection was
clearly intended. After all, attacks which employ weapons or tactics which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective are necessarily attacks which
are not directed at a specific military objective. At the same time, attacks which
use highly inaccurate or imprecise weapons may not have civilians as their
object. The attacker may hope the weapon strikes a military objective, and
simply not care that the weapon will very likely strike civilians. Such attacks
may not violate the proportionality rule either. The proportionality rule applies to attacks that are expected to both cause civilian harm and obtain military advantage. In contrast, the use of a highly inaccurate or imprecise

110. AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(1); AP II, supra note 15, art. 13(1) (omitting the terms
“which are additional to other applicable rules of international law” and presumably reflecting the view that there were no other applicable rules of international law regarding the
conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflict at the time of its adoption).
111. AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(4).
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weapon may be expected to either cause civilian harm or obtain military advantage, depending on what it happens to strike. To avoid such an inexplicable gap in general protection, the term ‘cannot’ should be interpreted
loosely, such that the rule prohibits attacks which employ a weapon “that
lacks the precision to ensure a reasonable probability that the [lawful] targets
under attack will be hit.”112
To be clear, general protection is not absolute protection. Protection
may be forfeited by taking direct part in hostilities or overridden to obtain
anticipated military advantage proportionate to expected civilian harm. Dangers arising from military operations can be minimized but not eliminated.
Even if all feasible precautions are taken, civilians may find themselves mistakenly targeted or suffer incidental harm that appears avoidable or excessive—though only in hindsight. Finally, general protection from military operations presupposes that military operations will take place. Again, it is not
the purpose of the law of armed conflict to make any and all effective military
action legally impossible.
At the same time, consider the canon that exceptions should be narrowly
construed. It is sometimes supposed that the law of armed conflict creates
distinct categories of persons and objects, some enjoying general protection
and others enjoying only limited and specific protections. This is not quite
correct. The law of armed conflict does not positively define civilians—say,
as members of the civilian population—and, separately, positively define
non-civilians—say, as members of armed forces and armed groups. Instead,
the law of armed conflict lays down a general rule with limited exceptions.
Under Protocol I, “[a] civilian is any person who does not belong to one of
the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the
Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol.”113 Similarly, “[c]ivilian
objects are all objects which are not military objectives.”114 In other words,
every person and object is civilian unless they fall within a carefully defined
exception.
The rule-exception structure of these definitional provisions both illuminates and is illuminated by related substantive protections. Consider the rule
that civilians shall not be the object of attack.115 In light of the definitional
provision, the legal content of this rule is that persons shall not be the object
112. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.23.2 (2004).
113. AP I, supra note 9, art. 50(1) (emphasis added).
114. Id. art. 52(1) (emphasis added).
115. Id. art. 51; AP II, supra note 15, art. 13.
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of attack unless they belong to one of the categories of non-civilians. Similarly,
consider the rule that civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of
reprisals.116 In light of the definitional provision, the legal content of this rule
is that objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals unless they are
military objectives. Other rules governing the conduct of hostilities inherit
this rule-exception structure, generally protecting all persons and objects
from avoidable and excessive harm, subject to limited exceptions for noncivilians and military objectives.
Similarly, the law of armed conflict does not create distinct categories of
civilians protected from attack, positively defined in terms of the civilian activities they perform, and civilians liable to attack, positively defined in terms
of taking a direct part in hostilities. Here too, the law of armed conflict lays
down a general rule with one limited exception: civilians shall not be the
object of attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.117
In my view, we should narrowly interpret the exceptional categories of
non-civilian persons and military objectives, as well as the exceptional activity of taking direct part in hostilities. Accordingly, we should presume that
the substantive rules protecting persons and objects apply to all persons and
objects unless they clearly fall within an exceptional category or clearly engage in an exceptional activity. We should adopt this approach, not because
an interpretive canon tells us to, but because the relevant canon illuminates
the text and reflects the purpose of the law. At the same time, if textual,
purposive, and structural considerations fail to resolve good faith disagreement, then we may invoke the canon to resolve residual doubts in favor of
a protective interpretation. States presumably knew of the relevant canon
when they adopted the rule-and-exception language, so it is not unfair to
resolve indeterminacies in their language in accordance with the cannon.
This approach, of narrowly construing exceptional categories and activities resulting in lack of protection, also logically coheres with two provisions
typically applied to situations of factual indeterminacy. First, “[i]n case of
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a
civilian.”118 At a minimum, this provides that in case of factual doubt as to
whether a person falls into an exceptional legal category of non-civilian, that
person shall be considered to be a civilian. Second, “[i]n case of doubt
whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes . . . is
116. AP I, supra note 9, art. 52(1).
117. Id. art. 51; AP II, supra note 15, art. 13.
118. AP I, supra note 9, art. 50(1).
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being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be
presumed not to be so used.”119 At a minimum, in case of factual doubt
whether the current use of such an object places it into the exceptional legal
category of military objective, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
In my view, purposive interpretation of the law of armed conflict requires a consistent approach to factual doubts and to legal doubts. Accordingly, in case of legal doubt whether a person or object falls into an exceptional legal category, such as combatant or military objective, that person or
object should be equally considered or presumed to be civilian. Consider the
following pairs of cases:
(a) There is factual doubt that a person performs service or support
functions for an armed group. There is legal doubt that a person performing service or support functions for an armed group is a noncivilian or takes direct part in hostilities.
(b) There is factual doubt that an oil refinery is used to generate reve-

nue to pay fighters. There is legal doubt that an oil refinery used to
generate revenue to pay fighters is a military objective.

There is no reason to treat such factual doubts differently than their corresponding legal doubts. In blunt terms, a civilian killed due to a mistake of
law and a civilian killed due to a mistake of fact are just as dead. The same is
true of civilian objects mistakenly destroyed. The purpose of the law is defeated in equal measure in either case. The point of the law is to avoid attacks
on persons and objects that are, in fact and in law, civilians. That point is
lost if doubts about whether a person or object is in fact civilian preclude
lawful attack, while doubts about whether a person or object is in law civilian
do not. That point stands if, as I have suggested, we resolve legal doubts
about the exceptional categories of non-civilians and military objectives, as
well as the exceptional activity of taking direct part in hostilities, by construing these exceptions narrowly, in favor of the general rule that all persons
and objects enjoy general protection under the law of armed conflict.
The general protection that civilians enjoy under international law should
put to rest an alternative vision of the law of armed conflict and its interpretation. On this view, States are presumptively legally free to act, in armed

119. Id. art. 52(3).
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conflict as elsewhere, unless a restrictive rule of international law demonstrably exists and clearly applies. Each specific restriction should be examined in
relative isolation, as it reflects a discrete exercise of sovereign will, and any
doubts as to its existence or content should be resolved in favor of State
freedom. This view is often associated with the so-called “Lotus principle”
regarding customary international law and with the restrictive interpretation
of treaties.120
Even on its own terms, the view that States enjoy a “presumption of
freedom” with respect to armed conflict faces rather severe problems. The
only “freedom principle” announced in the Lotus case concerned the presumptive freedom of States to exercise criminal jurisdiction in their own courts
and on their own territory. In contrast, “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a
permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form
in the territory of another State.”121 Needless to say, this first and foremost
restriction is now enshrined in the UN Charter, along with two limited exceptions.122 States enjoy no presumption of freedom to resort to armed force
or to conduct hostilities against another State. Quite the contrary. Accordingly, no presumption in favor of the permissive interpretation of the law of
inter-State force or the law of international armed conflict can rest on these
unstable grounds.
Similarly, States enjoy no presumption of freedom to resort to lethal
force on their own territory. Permissive interpretations of the law of noninternational armed conflict cannot restore a default rule of State freedom
120. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Road Ahead: Gaps, Leaks and Drips, 89 INTERNA373 (2013)

TIONAL LAW STUDIES 362,

[A]cknowledging ambiguity doesn’t open the door to a law-free zone, because international
law applies a default rule in such circumstances. Its default rule is the famous freedom principle, from the Lotus case. The principle has it that in the absence of a rule a State is deemed
free to act, and that a burden of persuasion falls upon the State that alleges some limitation
or restriction on another State’s freedom of action.

Sean Watts, Remarks by Lt. Col. Sean Watts, 111 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL ANNUAL MEETING 59, 62 (2017)
A competing baseline, of course, is that there is no law. In the absence of significant state
practice and especially lacking clear expressions of opinio juris, one might conclude either
that a Lotus-inspired rule of permissiveness operates or that there is simply no rule of conduct with respect to sovereignty in cyberspace at all.

121. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
122. U.N. Charter art. 42 (invoking Security Council authorization), art. 51 (exercising
“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence”).
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because no such rule exists. On the contrary, the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—unless strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation—it may not deprive any person
within its jurisdiction of their life.123
On one view, human rights law and the law of armed conflict apply simultaneously and in parallel. On this view, an interpretation of the law of
armed conflict that permits deprivation of life to an extent not strictly required would be futile, since human rights law would prohibit what this interpretation permits. On a different view, the general law of human rights is
modified by the special law of armed conflict, but only insofar as the latter
is specially designed with the exigencies of armed conflict in mind. On this
view, an interpretation of the law of armed conflict that permits deprivation
of life to an extent not strictly required would be self-defeating, since it would
undercut the rationale for modifying the general law to converge with the
special law.124
What about the supposed principle of restrictive interpretation, according to which treaty obligations should be narrowly construed and doubts
resolved in favor of State sovereignty? Some scholars trace the principle of
restrictive interpretation to Roman law principles of benign or humane interpretation, including resolving doubts in favor of individuals against the
State.125 Yet, in its modern form, the principle of restrictive interpretation
would result in less benign and humane interpretation of the law of armed
conflict, resolving doubts in favor of States against individuals. Others trace
its origins to the Roman law principle that doubts regarding contractual
terms should be resolved against the party who drafted the terms and in favor of the party who undertook the obligation, a principle that seems inapplicable to closely-negotiated multilateral treaties.126 Moreover, as we have

123. See ECHR, supra note 12 art. 2. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
124. See ILC Fifty-Eighth Session Report, supra note 83, at 409 (“That special law has
priority over general law is justified by the fact that such special law, being more concrete,
often takes better account of the particular features of the context in which it is to be applied than any applicable general law.”).
125. See Panos Merkouris, In Dubio Mitius, in BETWEEN THE LINES OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION?: CANONS AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 109, at 259 (tracing in dubio mitius to in dubiis benigniora, humanior
interpretation, and in dubio pro reo).
126. See Michael Waibel, The Origins of Interpretive Canons in Domestic Legal Systems, in BETWEEN THE LINES OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION?, id. at 25, 45 (tracing in dubio mitius to
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seen, “[t]he purpose of the humanitarian rules which comprise the bulk of
ius in bello is not to confer benefits upon the parties to a conflict but to protect
individuals and to give expression to concepts of international public policy.”127
Needless to say, all treaties manifest an intention of the parties to limit
their own sovereignty, accepting certain burdens in return for expected benefits or in service of higher values. So restrictive interpretation of treaties
always carries the risk of depriving a State of the benefit of its bargain, or
otherwise defeating the intention of the parties. At the same time, restrictive
interpretation of the law of armed conflict would not necessarily enhance
State sovereignty. Since the law of armed conflict applies equally to all parties, its restrictive interpretation would narrow the obligations of aggressor
States violating sovereignty, as well as victim States defending sovereignty,
organized armed groups fighting to usurp sovereignty, and State armed
forces fighting to preserve sovereignty.
In any event, whatever presumption of freedom States might have enjoyed before declaring that civilians shall enjoy general protection they have
given up. In the conduct of hostilities, the presumption is not State freedom,
but individual protection. Specific rules do not reflect discrete exercises of
sovereign will, but instead reflect States willing the integrated means jointly
necessary to achieve their broad end. We should not interpret specific rules
in isolation, since only by observing all of them can we hope to give effect
to the general protection that civilians shall enjoy. Nor should we restrictively
interpret specific rules if doing so would create inexplicable gaps in general
protection.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Some years ago, another author wrote in these pages that “[c]ompared to
domestic legal regimes, international law generally and even its legal sibling
the jus ad bellum, the law governing the conduct of hostilities lacks a deliberate
and well-defended interpretive theory.”128 In this article, I have not offered
contra proferentem and favor debitoris and concluding that “[i]n dubio mitius, therefore, is an example of a canon in which the original domestic canon is not well suited to the needs of
modern treaty interpretation”).
127. Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, 9
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 221, 227 (1983).
128. Sean Watts, Present and Future Conceptions of the Status of Government Forces in NonInternational Armed Conflict, 88 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 145, 165 (2012).
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such an interpretive theory. On the contrary, I have suggested that the law
governing the conduct of hostilities cannot have an interpretive theory all its
own but must share one with general international law, the law of inter-State
force, and human rights law.
Instead, I have argued that textual, purposive, and systemic interpretation is both necessary and appropriate, here as elsewhere. I distinguished
between distinct interpretive challenges—ambiguity, vagueness, incompleteness, and inconsistency—and illustrated how text, purpose, and other relevant rules of international law may help us overcome them. I showed that
the prevailing view of customary international law raises serious concerns—
both principled and practical—when applied to the law of armed conflict,
and I sketched some alternatives. I argued that the purpose of the law of
armed conflict is simply to protect, that it places no value on military necessity as such, and that limits to its protections reflect its relationship with other
rules of international law, including the law of inter-State force. I explored
the interpretive consequences of the general protection that civilians shall
enjoy under the law of armed conflict. These include broad and integrated
interpretation of specific protections that give effect to that general protection as well as narrow interpretation of limitations and exceptions. That is, I
hope, enough for now.
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